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THE EFFECTS OF HUMAN RELATIONS TRAINING ON
EMPATHIC ACCURACY AND DOGMATISM

BY



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A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Effects of Human Relations Training on Empathic Accuracy and Dogmatism" submitted by David Thomas Paley in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between an individual's degree of dogmatism and his ability to empathize accurately. An additional purpose was to explore the usefulness of incorporating human relations training into a full time counseling program aimed at increasing the interpersonal competence of the counselor trainee.

Twenty high and low dogmatic counselor trainees (as measured by Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale Form E) were placed in tetradic encounter groups where they were required to discuss themselves as future counselors. At the completion of this thirty minute discussion, each trainee was required to predict the degree of dogmatism of one high and one low dogmatic individual in his tetrad. This procedure was carried out prior to and following human relations training for the treatment group. An identical pre- and posttest procedure was used for the control group which received no training. The degree of empathic accuracy was determined for each rater by subtracting the actual score of the person rated from the predicted score attributed to that person by the rater.

It was found that low dogmatic trainees were significantly more empathically accurate than high dogmatic trainees prior to human relations training in both the treatment and control groups. It was also found that human relations training had no significant effect on increasing empathic accuracy for either high or low dogmatic trainees.

Methodological weaknesses inherent in the research design as well as barriers to learning and change were discussed as possible reasons for the apparent failure of human relations training to effect changes in empathic accuracy. Alternative designs for both research procedures and human relations training were also discussed.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In a recent statement of policy, the American Personnel and Guidance Association (1964) stressed that counselor training programs should be designed to assist the growth of the whole individual. Cognitive learning, in such areas as personality theory, research design, and counseling techniques, while important and necessary, is not in itself sufficient. Knowledge of one's attitudes and values, and the skills with which one relates personally are also important variables, and probably the most important to counselor effectiveness.

Rogers (1965) strongly supported this belief after reviewing recent research on the conditions which facilitate psychological growth:

... we are making progress in understanding the nature of this unique therapeutic relationship.... the essential elements appear to be not technical knowledge nor ideological sophistication, but personal human qualities—something the therapist experiences, not something he knows.... attitudes of realness, genuine liking, of sensitive empathy, help to create a climate which produces constructive personal growth and change (p. 107).

One personal human quality that appears to be essential for effective counseling is empathic accuracy. According to the American Personnel and Guidance Association (1964), the ability of the counselor to empathize accurately with his client is a primary requisite of counselor competence. Support for this contention is given in a series of research findings reported by Truax (1966), who concluded:

The positive relationship between accurate empathy and outcome of therapy holds for both hospitalized schizophrenics and out-patients seen in counseling. An analysis of the distribution of the ratings of accurate empathy indicated that the failure cases were typified by frequent low and moderate levels of accurate empathy... successful cases received fewer moments of superficial understanding from their therapists, while failure cases

received far fewer moments of deeply empathic understanding (p. 23).

Rokeach (1960), proposed that the ability to empathize accurately is largely dependent upon whether one's perceptual system is open or closed:

The extent to which information about the world is coerced into the system depends upon the degree to which the total belief-disbelief system is closed or open. At the closed extreme it is the new information that must be tampered with --by narrowing it out, altering it or containing it within isolated bounds. In this way the belief-disbelief system is left intact. At the open extreme, the converse is true. New information is assimilated 'as is' and in the hard process of reconciling it with other beliefs, communicates with other peripheral as well as intermediate beliefs, thereby producing 'genuine' (as contrasted with 'party-line') changes in the whole belief-disbelief system (p. 57).

In support of this contention, Rogers (1961), in his discussion of the counseling relationship, stressed the importance of defensiveness or rigidity being replaced by openness to experience; the counselor must become more aware of the external environment rather than seeing it in preconceived categories:

He is able to take in the evidence in a new situation, as it is, rather than distorting it to fit a pattern which he already holds. This increasing ability to be open to experience makes him far more realistic in dealing with new people, new situations, new problems. It means that his beliefs are not rigid, that he can tolerate ambiguity (p. 115).

According to Truax (1966), one way to increase empathic accuracy is to have the counselor trainee participate in human relations training as an integral part of his professional training. Truax feels that the beginning counselor can increase his ability to empathize by exploring, in a group setting, his own life values, his feelings toward his attempts to be helpful as a therapist, and his inhibitions in expressing warmth and caring to others.

Through a variety of specific activities or components, of which

sensitivity training is only one, human relations training purports to teach participants to become more honestly expressive and more perceptually efficient in human relationships.

Since, according to Rokeach (1960), accurate empathic understanding is theoretically related to and contingent upon open-mindedness, and both these personal qualities appear to be desirable and necessary to effective counseling, then it would seem purposeful to measure, and include in a program of counselor preparation, any method designed to increase these attributes.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the degree of open-mindedness of the counselor trainee and his ability to empathize accurately, and to determine the efficacy of human relations training for counseling students in helping to increase empathic accuracy.

DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this study, the following definitions have been adopted and are presented in the interest of reader understanding.

Open-mindedness is defined by Rokeach (1960) as:

... the extent to which a person can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information received from the outside on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within the person or from the outside (p. 57).

Since Rokeach devised the Dogmatism Scale from this definition, open-mindedness will be operationally defined as the score obtained on the Dogmatism Scale (Form E) (Appendix A).

Empathic Accuracy will be operationally defined as the discrepancy

between the actual responses of the individual and the predicted responses by the judge on the Dogmatism Scale (Form E). This will constitute an accuracy score. As perceptual accuracy increases, the nominal value of the accuracy score decreases.

Tetradic Encounter Group is defined by Webster (1968) as "a group, set of four things". In this study, a tetradic encounter group will be defined as a thirty minute private meeting of four individuals (two high and two low dogmatics), brought together to discuss themselves as counselor trainees with the specific goal of 'getting to know each other' as well as possible. These groups met prior to and following human relations training.

Human Relations Training is defined as an educational strategy attempting to create a temporary miniature culture in which the participants, through interaction with each other, can evaluate and change existing beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour patterns. Human relations training is offered to counseling students for graduate credit at the University of Alberta in the Educational Psychology Department.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED THEORY AND RESEARCH

I. EMPATHIC ACCURACY

Background

The necessity for counselors to acquire the ability to accurately empathize in the formation of a helping relationship is stressed by Katz (1963) who stated:

Counselors and psychotherapists in general cultivate the practice of empathy to a degree that is rare in other professions because they require an intimate appreciation of inner experiences, conflicts and attitudes. For them empathy is often a strategic factor in making diagnoses, and it is often decisive in the establishment of a helping relationship (p. 12).

According to Katz (1963), the necessity for counselors to possess empathic ability rests on the assumption that however similar human beings may be, there is something distinctive and unique about each person. Theoretical information and stereotypes the counselor may possess are useful only as guidelines; they cannot take the place of the independent and completely new study necessary each time he enters a counseling relationship with a different person.

The term empathy is used synonymously in a number of studies with such other terms as sensitivity, social perception, interpersonal perception and social insight (Mehryar, 1969; Bronfenbrenner et al., 1958; and Dunnette, 1969). A review of the literature on person perception indicates that the law of parsimony does not prevail and that the researcher is free to choose any one of the aforementioned terms in a research project designed to measure the process of 'getting to know' another

person Dymond (1948) has suggested that these various terms can be employed in researching the underlying process on which our understanding of others is built.

At the level of definition, there appears to be considerable agreement among theoreticians. Sixty years ago, Lipps (1909) used the term *Einfuhlung* which has since been translated to empathy. According to Buchheimer (1963), Lipps conceived of empathy as the taking in of the stimulus and the reintegration of it by the respondent. Thus, simply understanding the other person is not sufficient; the need to communicate that understanding to the stimulus person is also required.

Support for Lipps' contention that person to person interaction is necessary for an empathic process to occur is given by Katz (1963) who stated:

We tend to think of empathy as a reaction to the stimulus of personal contact with the other person. In a face-to-face encounter we feel the contagion of the attitudes and feelings of the other person.... At times this is an inner imitation; at other times it amounts to a physical sensation and may reveal itself in our gestures or in our facial expression. Our response is triggered by cues in the conversation or by impressions we receive of the state of mind or feeling of the other person (p. 4).

Dymond (1948) conceptualized empathy as the 'role-taking' ability of a person. She defined empathy as the "imaginative transposing of oneself into the thinking, feeling and acting of another and so structuring the world as he does (p. 127)."

Measurement

Based on her own definition of empathy, Dymond (1949) developed a standardized scale which provided a measure of empathic accuracy. Using a six item dichotomous rating scale (e.g. leader-follower) she found that

a person's empathic ability could be derived by calculating how closely his predictions of another's ratings corresponded with that person's actual ratings.

This initial attempt to operationalize the definition of empathy became known as the predictive approach to the measurement of empathy. The method and advantage of this approach was reviewed by Bronfenbrenner et al. (1958) who stated:

This procedure has typically involved asking a 'judge' to predict the responses of another in a questionnaire, and then comparing the prediction with the response. The discrepancy between predicted and actual response provides the basis for computing an accuracy score which then constitutes the measure of empathy... virtually every investigator, whether he speaks in terms of empathy, social insight, understanding, or 'ability to judge', proposes the same operational definition. With this almost universal agreement on measurement, problems of theoretical assumptions and possible conceptual distinctions have receded into the background (p. 33).

The aforementioned advantages of Dymond's prediction approach led to the measurement of empathic accuracy in a number of subsequent investigations. These researchers however, used somewhat different techniques in presenting the stimulus person to the rater.

Chance and Meaders (1960) used a taped interview to present a subject to be judged. Subjects listened to tape recordings of individuals who had previously filled out personality questionnaires. These subjects were then required to complete the same questionnaire as they thought the taped interviewee would complete it. A similar approach, using filmed interviews, was conducted by Cline and Richards (1960 and 1961).

These approaches that use techniques other than person to person encounter have tremendous relevance to counselor preparation. Much time

is spent by the counselor trainee listening to the counseling tapes of his supervisors and colleagues. His need for the ability to accurately perceive the feelings and behavioural patterns of both the counselor and client would appear obvious in enhancing his own counseling effectiveness.

However, inasmuch as empathy, by definition, implies person to person contact between the counselor and counselee, an interaction approach to obtaining a measure of empathic accuracy is more relevant. Smith (1966) recently evaluated the various methods of measuring empathic accuracy and concluded that, although from a measurement point of view the person to person interaction approach is more complex and time consuming, it does seem closest to everyday reality.

The prediction approach to the study of the empathic process has not gone unchallenged. Cronbach (1955) published a paper that sought to disentangle some of the effects which contributed to empathic accuracy scores and to identify separately measurable components. He stressed that the operational definition used by Dymond (1949) to measure empathic accuracy could yield impure and hence uninterpretable results.

According to Cronbach (1955), two sources of variance largely affecting empathic accuracy scores were the ability of the rater to attribute normative responses to the other person and the ability of the rater to predict differences between others on any single item.

Cline and Richards (1960) reported a number of factorial studies carried out to test Cronbach's hypothesis that global measures of accurate empathy could be effectively broken down into components. They concluded that there is a general ability to perceive others accurately but that this ability consists mainly of two independent factors: stereotype accuracy and differential accuracy.

In accordance with these two studies, an accurate empathizer is accurate because he has accurate stereotypes or because he is able to predict specific differences between individuals, or because he uses both skills when interacting with another person. This conclusion supports Dunnette's (1969) contention that:

... the process of getting to know a Specific Other person is essentially a matter of gathering and processing information about that person in the context of the other information one already has about himself, others he has observed, and stereotypes he has formed (p. 31).

Personality Correlates

The ability to empathize accurately is a skill possessed in differing degrees among different counselors. Buchheimer (1963) stated that among the counselor trainees whom he had supervised, differences between the occasionally and consistently empathic trainee were apparent.

This observation has been supported by recent research findings. Using 24 inpatients at Medota State Hospital, Truax (1966) completed a study designed to determine if the patient had any effect on the level of accurate empathy or if the effect was solely produced by the counselor. He concluded:

... different therapists indeed produced different levels of accurate empathy, even when interacting with the same set of patients ($p < .01$).... the ability to empathize seemed to be part of the therapist's make up and not contingent upon the client's make up (p. 62).

Truax's findings suggest that the ability to empathize accurately is related to the personality dimensions of the counselor. Postman, Bruner, and McGinnes (1948) emphasized that dimensions of variation in personality operate as selective factors in perception:

What one sees, observes, is inevitably what one selects from a near infinitude of potential percepts. Perceptual selection

depends not only on the primary determinants of attention but is also a servant of one's interests, needs, and values (p. 142).

To test their assumption that personal values are demonstrable determinants of what the individual selects perceptually from his environment, Postman et al. (1948) presented 25 Harvard subjects with 36 items on a tachistoscope representing equally the six values measured by the Allport-Vernon Study of Values. The words were equally familiar and shown randomly at .01 second intervals. The results of the study showed significantly that the higher the value of a word to each subject, the more rapidly it is likely to be recognized.

According to Maslow (1954), perceptual selection is largely dependent upon an individual's past habit formations. Although he recognized the value of habits in saving time and effort in recurrent situations, he also recognized that habits "tend to replace, in a lazy way, true and fresh attending, perceiving, learning and thinking (p. 277)."

Dunnette (1969) recently constructed a model which depicts the processes involved in the development of empathy between two persons. According to this model, each individual has a personal filter system and the relative permeability and fidelity of information transmission for each person's filtering system depends on the nature of his defense mechanisms, his interpersonal motives, and on a large number of cognitive factors. The nature and extent of information gathered during interactions with another person depends on the perceiver's view of people in general, of himself, and of specific subgroups. Thus the process of empathizing with another person involves complex linkages of information gathering, processing, inferring, and deducing with possibilities for inaccuracy existing anywhere along the line. If the individual's filter system is too tight,

the empathic process will be impeded.

Comparable to Dunnette's tight filter system and Maslow's habit formation, is Rokeach's (1960) conception of the open and closed minded individual. Rokeach contends that the ability to perceive accurately depends largely on how open or closed one's perceptual system operates. Rokeach's contentions will be further elaborated upon in the next section.

II DOGMATISM

Background

Many attempts have been made to locate a fundamental personality dimension which would account for the fact that some individuals have rigid mental processes and apparently need ready made ideas.

One such attempt which has had a profound effect on scientific thinking and investigation was the formulation of the Authoritarianism Personality by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950). The major hypothesis of these investigators was that the political, economic and social convictions of an individual often form a broad and coherent pattern and that this pattern, derived largely from early family experiences, was an expression of deep lying trends in his personality. The term 'authoritarianism' was adopted as the fundamental personality factor used to account for this pattern of adjustment. In order to measure underlying personality predispositions toward a fascistic outlook on life, the California 'F' or fascism scale was developed.

The publication of the F scale appeared in a text under the title The Authoritarian Personality. As a result, the scale became known not only as the 'fascism scale' but also as the 'authoritarianism scale'.

This gave rise to a certain amount of conceptual confusion since the scale shifts from 'Fascist authoritarianism' to 'general authoritarianism' without accumulating verifiable data to justify this shift from the particular to the general.

Theory

The conceptual confusion and apparent limitations of the F scale, prompted Rokeach (1960) to formulate the theory of dogmatism as a more comprehensive and adequate alternative:

What seems to be required, then, if we are to advance the study of authoritarianism, is a movement away from the conceptualization and measurement of rightist forms of authoritarianism... not to a refocus on left authoritarianism, but to the general properties held in common by all forms of authoritarianism... we should pursue a more theoretical, ahistorical analysis of the properties held in common by all forms of authoritarianism, regardless of specific ideological, theological, philosophic, or scientific content (p. 14).

To investigate the properties held in common by all forms of authoritarians, Rokeach proposed that the structural properties of belief systems, independent of their specific content, should be studied. A belief system, according to Rokeach (1960), is conceived of as an organization of verbal and non-verbal, implicit and explicit beliefs, sets, or expectancies that an individual has about the physical world, the social world, and the self. All of a person's beliefs, attitudes, and values are contained within his total belief system and represent his total framework for understanding his universe as best he can.

Rokeach (1960) views belief systems as being organized along three major dimensions: a belief-disbelief dimension, a central-peripheral dimension, and a time perspective dimension.

The disbelief system is not merely the mirror image of the belief

system but includes on the one hand a system of beliefs that one accepts and, on the other, a series of systems that one rejects. For example, the Catholic, Baptist, and Jew each accepts one set of beliefs and rejects several others. On this dimension a system is defined as closed to the extent that there is "a high magnitude of rejection of all disbelief subsystems, an isolation of beliefs, a high discrepancy in degree of differentiation between belief and disbelief systems, and little differentiation within the disbelief system (Rokeach, 1960, p. 61)."

According to Rokeach (1969), not all beliefs are equally important to the individual; beliefs vary with relative importance or centrality within a given belief system. Importance is defined solely in terms of connectedness. The more a given belief is functionally connected with other beliefs the more implications and consequences it has for other beliefs and, therefore, the more central the belief.

Most central are those beliefs that are learned by direct encounter with the object of belief and that are reinforced by a unanimous social consensus among all of one's reference persons and groups. These beliefs, referred to by Rokeach (1969) as primitive beliefs, represent basic truths about physical reality, social reality, and the nature of the self, and are psychologically incontrovertible because they are never experienced as subjects of controversy.

In functional relationship to central beliefs are non-primitive beliefs represented within the intermediate region. These beliefs do not have the same taken-for-granted character as primitive beliefs and serve the purpose of helping the person understand his environment. Authorities are the intermediaries to whom the person turns to for information

to supplement his own. Any given authority belief is controvertible because the believer has learned that some of his reference persons and groups do and some do not share his belief. It is also in this region that a person has beliefs about people in general depending on which reference groups they maintain and utilize.

Believing in the credibility of a particular authority implies an acceptance of other beliefs perceived to emanate from such authority. Such beliefs are defined by Rokeach (1969) as 'derived' beliefs and are much more controvertible than intermediate region beliefs since a change of belief with respect to authority, or a direct communication from one's authority, will lead to many other changes in beliefs deriving from authority.

Most peripheral are those beliefs which represent more or less arbitrary matters of taste and are referred to by Rokeach (1969) as 'inconsequential' beliefs because they have few or no connections with other beliefs. On this dimension, a system is defined as closed to the extent that:

... the more will the world be seen as threatening, the greater will the belief in absolute authority, the more will other persons be evaluated according to the authorities they line up with, and the more will peripheral beliefs be related to each other by virtue of intrinsic connections.... Similarly, the more closed a person's belief system, the more he should evaluate others according to their agreement or disagreement with his own system; also, the more difficult should it be to discriminate between and separately evaluate a belief and person holding the belief (Rokeach, 1960, p. 62).

The time perspective dimension varies from narrow to broad. A broad time perspective is one in which the person's past, present, and future are all represented within his belief system and the individual sees them as related to each other. Persons who have a completely past, present, or future oriented time perspective are all seen to have

equally narrow time perspectives. A belief system is defined as closed to the extent that there is "a narrow, future-oriented time perspective, rather than a more balanced conception of past, present, and immediate future in relation to each other (Rokeach, 1960, p. 64)."

All belief systems are organized along these three structural dimensions, independent of specific beliefs contained within the belief system. It is the way one believes rather than what one believes that determines the degree to which the individual can be said to be open or close minded.

III RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPATHIC ACCURACY AND DOGMATISM

A large and growing body of research supports the contention that empathic accuracy is significantly correlated with Rokeach's concept of dogmatism and Adorno's concept of authoritarianism.

Both open and closed minded individuals are likely to have within their perceptual repertoire various stereotypes about new people they encounter. However, the open minded individual is better able to see each new person as he exists in reality since he is more capable of assimilating within his perceptual system, the beliefs, values and attitudes of the other person. Given time, the non-dogmatic person will recognize and accept differences in the values and beliefs of the other person since authority to him is not absolute and people need not be evaluated according to their agreement or disagreement with such authority.

The possibility of comparing studies using F scale and Dogmatism scales (Form D and E) can be made on the strength of Rokeach's (1960) findings that the Dogmatism scale and F scale correlate from .54 to .77.

Also, the relationship between the two scales to be discussed in Chapter III, would make plausible the feasibility of comparing research findings using these two scales.

Scodel and Musen (1953) selected from a population of high and low authoritarians, one high F and one low F subject. Each pair carried on a 20 minute neutral discussion. After the discussion each member was asked to predict the responses of his partner on the F scale and on selected MMPI items. Discrepancy scores from the estimated and actual scores were derived. The authors found that high F subjects did not perceive low F subjects as having F scores significantly different from their own and low F subjects estimated high F subjects' F scores to be significantly higher than their own but lower than the high F subjects' actual scores. The low F individuals' estimates were also much more variable. There was also a tendency for the low subjects to be more accurate in their estimates of their partners' MMPI scores. Scodel and Musen concluded that "the over-all results generally support the hypothesis that non-authoritarians make more accurate judgements about authoritarians than authoritarians do about non-authoritarians".

Crockett and Meidinger (1956) replicated Scodel and Musen's study achieving the same results but with different conclusions. They assert that a high F score is characteristic of many fundamentalist and conservative groups in society who have little experience with contradictory views and are therefore likely to believe that a particular person will agree with him unless he has direct information to the contrary. Twenty minutes does not provide much direct information about the partner's belief system. However, in view of the wide dissemination given conser-

vative views by mass communication, a low F would be aware that a considerable number of people disagree with his views and that others share his beliefs. This would explain the greater variability of the low F subject's estimates.

Long and Ziller (1965), administered Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale (Form E) and four Decision Measures of Tendencies to Reserve Judgement to 72 freshmen women. They found that the lower the dogmatism score, the more the women tended to delay their judgements while searching for additional information. Dogmatic subjects, by limiting their intake of information, were able to maintain their conceptual system. Thus, Long and Zeller (1965) proposed that the dogmatic individual:

... defends an insecure self-structure by the expedient of restricting information input... the non dogmatic individual tended to delay decision and engage in predecisional search, to require more time for psychological judgements, and to respond 'don't know' to statements of opinion under conditions of inadequate information (p. 378).

These studies would suggest that given time, the non-dogmatic individual may indeed become more sensitive interpersonally than the dogmatic individual.

IV HUMAN RELATIONS TRAINING

Assumption and Goals

Human relations training can be viewed in a relatively broad context as a conscious use of primary group processes for purposes of re-educating people. Individuals participate as learners in a relatively unstructured group designed to generate data related on a personal level to the learners.

Although the human relations group is relatively unstructured in

terms of a preset agenda and format, it does operate with established assumptions and specific goals.

According to Bradford, Gibb, and Benne (1964), the human relations group assumes itself to be a miniature society wherein each member establishes a process of inquiry about his own motives, feelings and strategies in dealing with other persons and in turn learns also of the perceptions and reactions he produces in others as he interacts with them. A second assumption is that human relations training is not therapy, but is intended for participants who are essentially healthy normal-functioning individuals who desire to improve their functioning above its present generally adequate level.

A third assumption, stemming from the first two is that human relations training focuses upon the 'here and now' instead of upon past personal history. The immediate experiences of participants yield the raw data for laboratory learning. Focusing on situations away from the laboratory to relate past or future events becomes appropriate only when it effects present feelings and actions.

The desired outcomes and goals of human relations training have been cogently summarized by Maslow (1966) who stated that following training, the individual "... becomes more 'open to experience' (more efficient perceiving) and more 'fully functioning' (more honestly expressive) (p. 204)."

The same desired outcome is expressed by Dunnette (1969):

I believe a major goal of most T Groups is to make perceivers more aware of their own perceptual filters, to help them know more fully how they are perceived by others, and to help them be more aware of and sensitive to the attributes of Specific Others in their social worlds (p. 39).

Research

Research on the process and outcomes of human relations training has been steadily increasing since its formal inception at Bethel Maine in 1945. According to Stock (in Bradford, Gibb and Benne; 1964), some areas show a considerable concentration of work; in other areas the questions are clear but the methodology is not; and in still other areas even the questions are not yet well defined. The results of her survey of research on human relations training led her to conclude:

All of the following have been shown to be influenced by laboratory training: various perception of the self, affective behaviour, congruity between self percept and ideal self, self-insight, sensitivity to the feelings or behaviour of others, role flexibility, sensitivity to group decisions, diagnostic ability, behavioural skill, utilization of laboratory techniques, self confidence, and approach to diagnosing organization problems. And this is only a partial list. But these factors have also been shown to change, for some people, under certain circumstances. Much research has addressed itself to the question, 'What accounts for the fact that some participants learn certain things and others do not?' (p. 434).

The personality of the perceiver may be one accountable dimension. By placing high and low dogmatic subjects together in a three month human relations training group and investigating the accuracy of their empathic predictions, the investigator hoped to shed some light on the fact that 'some participants learn certain things and others do not'.

CHAPTER III

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

I THE SAMPLE

The sample used in this study consisted of 27 male and 9 female full time graduate students specializing in the area of Counseling Psychology. These students participated in human relations training as an integral part of their counselor preparation.

Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale (form E), containing 30 randomly selected buffer items from the California Personality Inventory, was handed out to each student when he formally enrolled in the 1969-70 human relations course, and each was asked to complete the scale and return it by the last day of registration. Prior to registration, each student had been randomly assigned to the experimental or control group by the course administrators. Students placed in the experimental group received training from one of three facilitators during the fall term; the control group received no such training until the spring term. Of the 48 students given the scale, 36 returned useable forms in time to be assigned to the pre-experimental setting; 20 of these 36 were from the experimental group and the other 16 were from the control group.

II THE TESTING INSTRUMENT

The Dogmatism Scale

Construction The main purpose of the Dogmatism Scale is the measurement of individual differences in open and closed belief systems. According to Rokeach (1960), the scale should also serve to measure

general authoritarianism and general intolerance since these concepts are included in his definition of open and closed belief systems.

To construct the Dogmatism Scale, Rokeach deduced from the various defining characteristics of open and closed belief systems, a number of statements designed to measure these characteristics. Items involving the belief-disbelief dimension, the central-peripheral dimension, and the time perspective dimension, were formulated to yield a comprehensive coverage of the theory of dogmatism. Each statement was designed to cut across specific ideological position in order to penetrate to the structural characteristics of all positions. Therefore, according to Rokeach (1960):

Persons adhering dogmatically to such diverse viewpoints as capitalism and communism, Catholicism and anti-Catholicism, should all score together at one end of the continuum, and should all score in a direction opposite to others having equally diverse yet undogmatic viewpoints (p. 72).

The final Form E, containing the best 40 items taken from the 66 item Form D, was used in this study. Subjects indicated disagreement or agreement with each item on a scale ranging from -3 to +3 with the zero point excluded in order to force responses in either direction. For scoring purposes the scale was converted to a 1 - to - 7 scale by the addition of the constant four to each item score. The total dogmatism score was the sum of scores obtained on all items of the test. For all statements, agreement is scored as closed and disagreement as open.

In addition, 30 items randomly selected from the California Personality Inventory (normally answered by indicating simply true or false) were included as buffer items converted to the same -3 to +3 scale to better facilitate their use as buffer items. Rokeach (1960), believed that the use of buffer items served to disguise the purpose of the

Dogmatism Scale. These items were not analyzed nor included in the total score. The complete questionnaire, including Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale (Form E) and the CPI, is shown in appendix A.

Reliability According to Rokeach (1960, p. 89), the Dogmatism Scale went through five editions. These revisions were made in order to increase reliability as well as reflect theoretical modifications. Various studies reported by Rokeach (1960), using college students from different countries, destitute veterans, and worker samples yielded reliability figures ranging from .68 to .93 on the final 40-item scale Form E. A three month test-retest study, conducted by Sawatzky (1968) on a group of 20 subjects, yielded a reliability coefficient of .83 on the Dogmatism Scale (Form E).

Validity One way to determine whether the Dogmatism Scale actually measures what it is supposed to measure is to administer it to people known on other grounds to be open or closed in their belief systems. This is the Method of Known Groups used by Rokeach, Gladin, and Trumbo (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 101-108). Psychology students in a graduate seminar conducted by Rokeach were given a brief written description of the defining characteristics of persons with open and closed belief systems and were asked to select from among their peers, high and low dogmatic persons. The results showed that the two selected groups differed significantly ($p < .01$) in mean dogmatism scores.

Another method to establish validity is by correlating scores on the Dogmatism Scale with other scales purporting to measure similar characteristics of dogmatic people. Rokeach computed correlations between the scores obtained on the Dogmatism Scale and on the F Scale

and stated:

If our hypothesis is correct that one scale measures a general form of the phenomenon and the other a particular form, then we should expect to get sizable positive correlations for persons who take both tests.... For the seven groups... the correlations range from .54 to .77 (p. 121).

Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale (Form E), containing the CPI buffer items, was used to obtain measures of both dogmatism and empathic accuracy for all subjects participating in this study.

III ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURES

To determine which subjects would be designated high dogmatics and which low dogmatics, the test scores obtained from each group, experimental and control, were ranked separately in descending order. The top fifty percent of each group were considered high dogmatics and the bottom fifty percent low dogmatics. Rather than using the customary twenty-five percent extremes, the above system was adopted because of the small number of subjects used in the study.

For pre-test purposes, subjects in the experimental group were assigned to one of five tetrads, each containing two low dogmatics and two high dogmatics. The subjects were then asked by the experimenter to discuss topics relating to themselves as counselors and counselor trainees. They were also asked to try to get to know one another as well as possible as they would be required to fill out questionnaires on each other after the 30 minute encounter.

At the completion of this half-hour small group discussion, each subject was given two copies of the Dogmatism Scale (Form E) each containing the name of the subject (one high and one low dogmatic) he was

required to rate. His instructions were to fill out these scales the way he thought each of the other two individuals would complete it on himself.

The total dogmatism score obtained from the subject's self rating constituted the actual score, with the rater's total score constituting the predicted score. The difference between the two measures yielded an empathic accuracy score.

Following three months of human relations training, the pre-test procedures were duplicated for the post-test. Each subject met with his same tetrad for 30 minutes and rated the same two people he had rated in the pre-test situation. All experimenter instructions were the same. In addition, a new dogmatism score was obtained for each subject immediately prior to the post-test tetradic encounter. Empathic accuracy scores were again calculated.

Control group procedures for obtaining empathic accuracy scores were identical to experimental group procedures.

Since it was the intention of the investigator to measure a generalized empathic ability and not just knowledge of a specific individual, care was taken to insure that each rater was paired with persons from a training group other than his own.

Also, since it was considered important that subjects behave in a natural way, discussions were not completely structured in terms of topic content nor did the experimenter 'sit-in' with the tetrads to make sure the topic focused strictly on the counseling theme.

IV HYPOTHESES

Maslow (1965) recognized the need to investigate the relationship

between individual differences and human relations training; the tendency of 'T-group' theorists has been to ignore individual differences in determining capacity for growth, openness and empathic change.

The theory and research relating to dogmatism suggests that the ability to accurately empathize is largely dependent upon the individual's perceptual system. (Scodel and Musen, 1953, Burke 1966, and Dunnette, 1969). The highly dogmatic individual alters and contains new information within isolated bounds to keep his belief-disbelief system intact. His tendency toward premature closure in predecisional search and cognitive rigidity in rendering 'black and white' decisions would retard his 'growth' towards empathic accuracy. Conversely, the low dogmatic assimilates new information 'as-is', and in reconciling this information with other beliefs produces genuine changes in the whole belief-disbelief system. His tendency toward utilizing a wider range of information in decision making and in being more objective and less stereotyped in his thinking would accelerate his 'growth' towards empathic accuracy.

The theory and research would then logically suggest the following hypotheses:

Hypotheses I. Following the first tetradic encounter, prior to human relations training, low dogmatics in both the experimental and control groups will be more empathically accurate than high dogmatics in the experimental and control groups. Operationally defined, the mean accuracy score (mean discrepancy between the actual scores and the predicted response scores) will be lower for the low dogmatics than for the high dogmatics.

Hypothesis II. Following the second tetradic encounter, after 11 weeks of human relations training, experimental group low dogmatics will improve more than experimental group high dogmatics in the ability to accurately empathize. Operationally, the post-experimental gain in mean accuracy scores will be greater for low dogmatics than for high dogmatics.

Hypothesis III. Human relations training will effect some degree of 'growth' towards empathic accuracy in both high and low dogmatic groups. Therefore, it is expected that the post-experimental gain in mean accuracy scores will be greater for the experimental group than for the control group.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

I. STATISTICAL TREATMENT

The differences between pre-experimental accuracy scores were determined for high and low dogmatic trainees in both the experimental and control groups. In addition, the differences in post-experimental gains in mean accuracy scores were also obtained. The "t" test of the average mean differences was applied in order to establish whether any significant difference and change had occurred. The level of significance prescribed was the .05 level.

II. RESULTS

Hypothesis I is confirmed (see Tables I and II). Low dogmatics in both the experimental and control groups were significantly more empathically accurate than high dogmatics in the experimental and control groups.

In addition, high dogmatics in both the experimental and control groups were significantly more accurate when rating high dogmatics than when rating low dogmatics. Low dogmatics in both the experimental and control groups, while being more empathically accurate than high dogmatics, did not display significant differential accuracy when rating high and low dogmatics.

Hypothesis II is not confirmed (see Table III). Low dogmatic

counselor trainees did not improve in their ability to empathize accurately significantly more than high dogmatic counselors as a result of human relations training.

Hypothesis III is not confirmed (see Table IV). The post-experimental gain in mean accuracy scores was not significantly greater for the experimental group than for the control group. Important to this hypothesis is the finding that no significant gain in empathic accuracy was obtained for either of the high or low dogmatic treatment groups (see Table V).

TABLE I

MEAN ACCURACY SCORE DIFFERENCES FOR HIGH AND LOW DOGMATIC TRAINEES PRIOR TO HUMAN RELATIONS TRAINING

	\bar{d}_h	\bar{d}_l	\bar{d}_{h-l}	s	t	p
EXPERIMENTAL	42.0	24.2	17.8	7.1	2.51	.05
CONTROL	53.4	27.8	16.6	7.0	2.37	.05

TABLE II

MEAN ACCURACY SCORE DIFFERENCES FOR HIGH AND LOW DOGMATIC TRAINEES RATING HIGH AND LOW DOGMATICS PRIOR TO HUMAN RELATIONS TRAINING

		\bar{d}_h	s.d.	\bar{d}_l	s.d.	t	p
EXPERIMENTAL	High	29.4	21.4	54.6	17.4	3.05	.02
	Low	19.7	16.2	28.6	21.1	1.11	n.s.
CONTROL	High	41.6	27.8	62.6	19.1	5.64	.001
	Low	12.9	6.6	42.8	38.7	2.10	n.s.

TABLE III

DIFFERENCES IN POST-EXPERIMENTAL MEAN ACCURACY SCORE GAINS
BETWEEN TREATMENT GROUP HIGH AND LOW DOGMATIC TRAINEES

	\bar{D}_h	\bar{D}_l	\bar{D}_{h-l}	s	t	p
TREATMENT GROUP	2.5	1.3	1.2	6.5	0.18	n.s.

TABLE IV

DIFFERENCES IN POST-EXPERIMENTAL MEAN ACCURACY SCORE GAINS
BETWEEN TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUPS

	\bar{D}_e	\bar{D}_c	\bar{D}_{e-c}	s	t	p
HIGH DOGMATICS	2.5	17.9	15.4	7.6	2.01	n.s.
LOW DOGMATICS	1.4	01.2	00.2	7.7	0.02	n.s.

TABLE V

GAINS IN EMPATHIC ACCURACY SCORES FOR TREATMENT GROUP HIGH
AND LOW DOGMATICS

	\bar{d}_1	s.d.	\bar{d}_2	s.d.	\bar{D}	t	p
HIGH DOGMATICS	42.0	17.4	39.4	15.6	2.6	0.66	n.s.
LOW DOGMATICS	24.2	13.9	22.9	15.7	1.3	0.26	n.s.

III DISCUSSION

The relatively strong confirmation of the first hypothesis suggests that a relationship does exist between an individual's ability to accurately perceive another person's degree of dogmatism and his own degree of dogmatism.

According to Rokeach (1960) the low dogmatic will perceive more accurately because he is able to assimilate new information 'as-is' rather than distorting the new information or evaluating it in terms of the particular authorities he subscribes to.

However, the non-dogmatic individual may be more accurate because he had formed a more accurate stereotype. Long and Ziller (1965) concluded that the non-dogmatic rater tends to require more time for psychological judgement and to respond 'don't know' to statements of opinion under conditions of inadequate information. On the forced choice questionnaire used after the first brief tetradic encounter, non-dogmatic raters avoided predicting extreme responses and may appear more accurate since they have chosen mean responses.

The high-dogmatic tends to assume similarity in beliefs where brief and initial interactions do not provide much information about another person's degree of dogmatism. Burke (1966) requested high and low dogmatic college students to complete Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale (Form E) the way they believed the typical college student would answer it. Burke found that high dogmatics did estimate that the average college student was close to themselves with respect to dogmatic responses, whereas the low dogmatic's responses were more variable and more closely aligned with the mean dogmatism score of the college students.

Hence, the high dogmatic will assume similarity and be more accurate when rating high dogmatics whereas the low dogmatic will assume mean responses and appear generally more accurate when rating high and low dogmatics.

Hypothesis II and III were not confirmed. Before discussing possible reasons for the apparent failure of human relations training to effect changes in empathic accuracy, some of the methodological weaknesses inherent in the research design, which may have served to negate expected increases in empathic accuracy, will be discussed.

The empathic process involves a person to person interaction where the empathizer not only understands the other person but also communicates that understanding to the stimulus person (Lipps, 1909; Katz, 1963). This process may be difficult to establish between two individuals in a brief initial encounter. It may be much more difficult where there are four individuals.

The use of tetrads, rather than the customary dyads, was incorporated into the research design to obtain data for the first hypothesis. This procedure could possibly have rendered uninterpretable the data obtained for the remaining hypothesis. Several of the counselor trainees stated that their tetrad separated into two dyads and therefore each of the participants was forced to rate at least one individual with which he had not interacted. This separation into two dyads apparently occurred for both the pre and post-experimental encounters.

Differential gain scores in empathic accuracy between treatment group high and low dogmatics may have been negated because of the lack of extreme scores in the sample. Because of the small sample, the

customary twenty-five percent extremes could not be used. Although the high and low treatment groups differed significantly in degree of dogmatism, ($t = 5.11$, $p < .001$), the high dogmatics may actually have been moderate dogmatics.

Although local norms are not available, Alter and White (1966) reported norms for 37 samples of various college populations. The overall mean for all 12,977 scores was 159.2 with a standard deviation of 31.38. The mean dogmatism score of the high dogmatic group participating in human relations training was 146.5 with a standard deviation of 14.6. Although the relative scarcity of highly dogmatic counselor trainees in the program is assuring if the aforementioned theory is correct, that is, effective counseling is enhanced by open-mindedness in one's belief system, this finding would tend to alter the expected results.

Support for this contention is given by Taylor (1960) who has indicated that if linearity is assumed then basic differences between personalities of extreme scores is important with the middle group being an unimportant link. But if the relationship is curvilinear, then the middle group becomes a decisive factor and must be presented in relation to the extremes. Research on Dogmatism has always focused on extreme scores and the nature of the moderate dogmatic's belief system is not known.

There are several possible reasons for the apparent failure of human relations training to effect changes in empathic accuracy. According to Benne, Bradford, and Lippit (1964), barriers to learning and change in human relations training are complex and when these barriers are not recognized by those planning the learning situations, results can be

relatively slight.

One such barrier is the failure of an individual to recognize the need for increased empathic skills. Usually a person brings to a formal learning experience some dissatisfaction with his present situation or behavior. Human relations training in this department is a compulsory course for all counselor trainees; individuals who possibly enter the program because they feel they already have the personal attributes necessary for helping others and simply are lacking in counseling techniques. Counselor incumbents often do not become aware that effective counseling requires self-knowledge and personal growth until they begin practical experience with counseling and this practical experience does not precede the human relations training.

A second barrier to learning in human relations training is the failure of the facilitator to encourage collaboration and trust among members, and thus reduce the threats inherent in self-exposure. Each trainee must feel free to expose his feelings and thoughts. Without this honest expression, feedback becomes impossible and learning and change cannot occur. Where the facilitators are professors and the group members are fellow graduate students, a complex network of anxieties related to such external events as course grades, social friendships, and counselor certification may serve to impede the formation of trust and honest expression of feelings.

A third barrier to learning mentioned by Benne et al. (1964) is the failure of the human relations training design to include assistance in planning the application of laboratory learnings. Each member may learn to more accurately perceive fellow members without transferring

this skill to persons outside of the group. Each participant in this investigation was required to rate individuals outside of his own human relations group. The individual may not have learned how to transfer his increased ability in perceiving others; that is, he may not have learned basic underlying processes involved in accurately empathizing with people.

A simple pre-post design was used in this investigation and no data was obtained to see if any of these barriers had been effectively removed or accounted for.

Location and time limitations have been recognized by Schein and Bennis (1965) as major dimensions opposing change as a result of human relations training. These authors outline several different types of laboratory training ranging from total residential (full time removal from occupation and family) to part-time nonresidential (maintains normal occupational and familial routine). Schein and Bennis conclude from several research findings that the non-residential laboratory offers less freedom in training design possibilities and that "the residential laboratory, total or partial provides a more integrated, intensive learning experience (p. 74)."

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I SUMMARY

The present study has explored the relationship between an individual's degree of dogmatism and his ability to accurately empathize. It has also explored the usefulness of incorporating human relations training into a full time counseling program aimed at increasing the interpersonal competence of the counselor trainee.

High and low dogmatic counselor trainees (as measured by Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale Form E) were placed in tetradic encounter groups where they were required to discuss themselves as future counselors. At the completion of this discussion, each trainee was required to predict the degree of dogmatism of one high and one low dogmatic individual in his tetrad. This procedure was carried out prior to and following human relations training for the treatment group. An identical pre- and posttest procedure was used for the control group which received no training. The degree of accuracy was determined for each rater by subtracting the actual score of the person rated from the predicted score attributed to that person by the rater.

Three hypotheses were formulated as logical outgrowths of the theory and research pertaining to empathic accuracy, open-mindedness, and human relations training.

Hypothesis I. Prior to human relations training, open-minded individuals in both the treatment and control groups will be more empathically

accurate than closed-minded individuals in the treatment and control groups.

Hypothesis II. Following human relations training, treatment group low dogmatics will improve more than treatment group high dogmatics in the ability to accurately empathize.

Hypothesis III. Human relations training will serve to increase empathic accuracy for all members of the treatment group in comparison to all members of the control group.

Only the first hypothesis was confirmed. The second and third hypotheses failed to achieve significance at the .05 level.

The data obtained for the first hypothesis supported the contention that high dogmatics tend to assume similarity of belief systems whereas low dogmatics tend to be indecisive and assume mean responses under conditions of brief and initial interactions.

The data obtained for the second and third hypotheses failed to attribute to the treatment, any significant effect on increasing empathic accuracy. Methodological weaknesses inherent in the research design which may have served to negate increases in empathic accuracy were discussed. In addition, barriers to learning and change were discussed as possible reasons for the apparent failure of human relations training to effect changes in empathic accuracy.

II RECOMMENDATIONS

In retrospect, a number of possible alternative procedures which could have been taken in the present study will be suggested as a

rationale for future research. In addition, changes in the design of human relations training which might make possible an increase in empathic accuracy and interpersonal competence will be suggested.

The simple analysis of pre-post change scores may not be sufficient in an investigation designed to measure the effects of human relations training on learning and changing one's ability to perceive more accurately. The complexity of the treatment variable may warrant a closer scrutiny of the processes involved. It may not be enough to assume that laboratory training is a standardized treatment; the level of learning desired and outcome goals should be specified clearly prior to the training and measures taken to assure that the group is accomplishing these specified levels of learning and goals. In this investigation, tape recordings of each session could have been evaluated by a number of competent independent raters to assure that the aforementioned barriers listed by Benne et al. (1964) had been removed and that the goals of the training groups were being met.

Dyadic encounter groups rather than the tetradic encounter groups used in this investigation would possibly yield more interpretable data and follow more closely past research using the prediction approach to the measurement of empathy. Because of the small number of counselor trainees in any given year enrolled in human relations training, there are not enough subjects to give a meaningful measure of the first hypothesis using simple dyads. However, the use of dyads may give each participant a better chance to establish and maintain an empathic process and hence make possible the measurement of empathic change.

According to Rabinowitz (1956) and Burke (1966), a thirty minute

brief and initial encounter does not provide much information about another person's degree of dogmatism or any other personality variable. Since it is possible that subjects are unable to differentiate accurately among the others they are required to rate, it would seem feasible to either lengthen the pre and post treatment interaction time or provide for a series of dyadic interactions throughout the treatment period. This latter alternative may prove to yield a more valid measure of empathic accuracy gain since it more closely approximated the usual counseling process.

Alternative formats to the weekly three hour training sessions could be initiated by the department to give a more intensive and comprehensive learning experience. Schein and Bennis (1965) have indicated that a total or partial residential laboratory is preferable to the part time nonresidential training sessions offered in this department. Counselor trainees could participate in several weekend sessions or in longer weekly groups either together with professors as facilitators or in independent training groups with members from a more diverse sample of the general population.

Truax (1966) has suggested that counselor trainees participate in 'quasi-therapy' sessions as part of their counselor preparation. Truax reports significant increases in empathic accuracy in a number of investigations as a result of these groups. Personal feelings and thoughts are exposed in these groups as they are in human relations training but in addition counselor trainees role play the position of the client and in general, focus their sessions on themselves as counselors. Perhaps this type of training is more relevant and useful in increasing the empathic

accuracy of the counselor.

The ability to infer and accurately empathize has been recognized as being of paramount importance to the counselor regardless of the techniques he uses in the counseling process. An important role of counselor preparation programs is to insure that each trainee increases his ability to empathize and hence become more interpersonally competent before counselor certification. Research on interpersonal competence and methods designed to increase this competence must continue if counselor effectiveness is the desired outcome in counselor preparation programs.

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APPENDIX A

Name _____

Phone _____

The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels about a number of important social and personal questions. The best answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do.

Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one.

Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in each case.

+1: I agree a little
+2: I agree on the whole
+3: I agree very much

-1: I disagree a little
-2: I disagree on the whole
-3: I disagree very much

1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.
2. When in a group of people I usually do what the others want rather than make suggestions.
3. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.
4. My daily life is full of things that keep me interested.
5. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.
6. I doubt whether I would make a good leader.
7. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.
8. I sometimes pretend to know more than I really do.
9. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
10. Most of the arguments or quarrels I get into are over matters of principle.

11. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.
12. I set a high standard for myself and I feel others should do the same.
13. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.
14. When in a group of people I have trouble thinking of the right things to talk about.
15. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.
16. Once in awhile I laugh at a dirty joke.
17. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.
18. Before I do something I try to consider how my friends will react to it.
19. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.
20. It is hard for me to act natural when I am with new people.
21. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.
22. I enjoy social gatherings just to be with people.
23. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.
24. I seem to be about as capable and smart as most others around me.
25. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.
26. It is very hard for me to tell anyone about myself.
27. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a living coward.
28. I like to be the center of attention.
29. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
30. I can be friendly with people who do things which I consider wrong.
31. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.
32. I am likely not to speak to people until they speak to me.
33. If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to the world.

34. I have a tendency to give up easily when I meet difficult problems.
35. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers.
36. I like parties and socials.
37. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.
38. People pretend to care more about one another than they really do.
39. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.
40. At times I have worn myself out by undertaking too much.
41. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.
42. I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job.
43. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.
44. Sometimes I cross the street just to avoid meeting someone.
45. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.
46. I usually expect to succeed in things I do.
47. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
48. I think most people would lie to get ahead.
49. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from the way we do.
50. I have been afraid of things or people that I knew could not hurt me.
51. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.
52. When I was a child I didn't care to be a member of a crowd or gang.
53. The worst crime a person could commit is to attach publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does.
54. When I am cornered I tell that portion of the truth which is not likely to hurt me.

55. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp.
56. I have often felt guilty because I have pretended to feel more sorry about something than I really was.
57. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.
58. I would have been more successful if people had given me a fair chance.
59. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.
60. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something.
61. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.
62. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.
63. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.
64. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.
65. It is often desirable to reserve judgement about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.
66. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.
67. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.
68. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all."
69. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.
70. Most people just don't know what's good for them.

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